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THE DENVER

BAR ASSOCIATION

acceptance and use of the law, or
would result in its repeal.
Most Denver attorneys know we
have such a law. Few know much
more than that about it.. In this county, there have been only thirteen proceedings in the twenty-three years the
law has been on our statute books.
Query: Does this meager use of the
law in this county mean: (a) That
registration of title under the law Is
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not practicable from the viewpoint of
both the profession and the layman;
(b) or that failure to make use of it
is the result of the constitutional conservatism of the profession; (c) or
may it be attributed to mental inertia?
Perhaps the lack of use may be attributed to all three reasons, and may
It not be sometimes difficult to place
the line of distinction between the latter two.

Tax Sales and Tax Titles in Colorado
By JOHN F. MAIL, Esq.
of the Denver Bar
In the construction of the revenue
laws of Colorado, the Supreme Court
early in its history adopted two rules
of construction.
The first is that revenue laws or enactments for the levy, assessment and
collection of taxes shall be construed
liberally in favor of the State and
against the tax-payer and his property
to the end that the State may acquire
a revenue with the least possible
trouble and expense. That is to say,
all doubtful questions of taxation so
far as the levy and assessment are
concerned are resolved in favor of the
taxing power.
On the other hand, when we come
to the sale of lands (I am not here
considering the sale of personalty at
all) for delinquent taxes, the rule which
the Supreme Court adopted early in
its history is the rule in every State
in the Union and is the rule enforced
by the Supreme Court of the United
States. That is, the power tq divest
one of title to his property by a sale
thereof for taxes is a power that will
be construed with the utmost strictness against the taxing power and
against the person purchasing at a
tax sale. This is to the end that while

the State will exercise relentlessly its
power to procure a revenue sufficient
for the needs of the State, it will bear
upon the taxpayer as lightly as possible and take advantage of every technicality to the end that he may not
lose his property and be divested of his
title for a grossly inadequate consideration. But even here the legislature
and the courts, while they give him almost every opportunity to pay the tax
without losing his property, always
insist that before his property is entirely free of the lien, he must pay the
tax with a rate of interest sufficient to
induce persons to pay it for him by
tax sale purchase in the first instance
to the end that the State may have its
revenue.
Originally in the history of modern
taxation there was no limit upon the
power of the State to tax; and out of
this principle grew the maxim that
the power to tax is the power to destroy. But that power to destroy is
withheld by the people of Colorado in
their constitution from the legislative
body, and while the power to tax in
this State is exceedingly great, it has
its constitutional. limitations, which it
is not necessary here to discuss.
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The power to tax in Colorado lies in
the legislature, subject to constitutional restrictions. The power to sell
the property of the tax-payer for nonpayment of the tax rests in the legislature, subject to constitutional restrictions. But, while the courts have
never to any appreciable extent interfered with the legislature in either
the levy, assessment, the collection of
the tax or the sale of property therefor, they have by certain rules of statutory construction as hereinabove suggested put forth a restraining hand to
the end that the power of the State to
divest one of his property for nonpayment of tax shall be exercised in the
most humane manner possible consistent with the ultimate collection of the
tax; and while the legislature has provided that when the tax is levied and
assessed and remains unpaid for a
definite time the land against which
the assessment and levy is made may
be sold, and while the legislature has
provided that within a very reasonable
time after the sale, no redemption being made, the title of the owner may
be entirely divested by a tax deed, yet
the courts have ruled that every step
leading up to the deed itself must be
in extremely strict accordance with
the very letter of the statute or the
divestiture of the title by the deed
will not take place. In fact, it has
been said by one great writer on this
subject that a number of the conditions precedent to a tax sale and deed
announced by the legislature are apparently for the sole purpose of making it more difficult to acquire a valid
tax deed.
The result, therefore, is, in this
State, that it has become almost a
maxim that a tax deed unaided by any
statute of limitation is not a good or
marketable title to real property. In
this connection I am constrained to
quote from an eminent Judge of the
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late Court of Appeals
wherein he said,-

of Colorado,

"The collector of rare specimens
of legal documents searching in this
jurisdiction for a valid tax deed will
need to make diligent inquiry."
But the holder of any tax deed can
rely with confidence upon the assurance that his deed, the same as the
certificate of purchase preceding it,
affords ample security for the return
to him of his investment with an inviting rate of interest, and this must
be paid to him before the lien of the
tax can be discharged to satisfy prospective purchasers or encumbrancers.
Assuming, therefore, that a tax deed
standing alone in Colorado is not a
valid or marketable title to real property, it follows that we should next
inquire if there be any statutory enactment or procedure whereby it could
be made a good or marketable title.
If the deed be fair on its face-that
is, in substantial conformity with the
form of deed prescribed by the legislature, signed by the treasurer, acknowledged before a proper officer
and recorded, it prima facie divests
the title of the former owner; but at
any time within five years from the
recording of the deed the former owner may show a slight variance from
the strict procedure somewhere along
the line between the assessment and
the deed and still invalidate the deed;
but if the grantee in the tax deed or
his grantee should take actual possession of the property so that in order to
recover it the former owner must
bring an action for possession or ejectment under the old practice, the defendant in possession under the tax
deed may plead that the deed has been
of record for more than five years and
defeat recovery, whether he hath paid
any tax subsequent to the recording of
the deed or not; but if the deed be
void on its face, which it is in almost
all instances, the plea of this statute
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may not be interposed, because our
courts say there is nothing upon which
to base the plea, the deed showing on
its face that it is a mere nullity. Nor
can this so-called five year statute of
limitations be interposed in any action
except one brought by the former owner to recover the property against one
in possession under the tax deed. That
is to say, it cannot be interposed in
actions to remove cloud, to quiet title,
injunction or any other possible action
than one to recover possession of the
property. So that this five year limitation act, which is found in the revenue laws, is exceedingly restricted
in its availability.
There are two other statutes of limitation not found in the revenue laws
but in the general limitation laws of
the State, one being to the effect that
any person claiming land under color
of title made in good faith, who shall
during seven years remain in actual
possession of the land and pay all
taxes legally assessed thereon, shall
be adjudged the owner.
Another
statute is virtually the same as the
one above referred to, except during
the seven years the land shall remain
vacant and unoccupied.
We have a number of cases in this
State where the plea under the above
statutes has been held to be good and
a great many where it was held not
sustained by the proof and the construction of these statutes is the same
as the strict construction under the
revenue law. That is, as said in an
early case in the Court of Appeals,"One who desires to avail himself of
these statutes must bring himself
strictly within their terms."
What
does or does not bring one strictly
within the terms of these statutes is
a matter of many decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of
Colorado and space would not allow
me to discuss them here.
Many other statutes of limitation
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found in our general laws have been
invoked from time to time in support
of tax titles, but our court has consistently held that none apply except
the three above referred to.
There is one remaining procedure to
validate a tax title in this State which
is practiced with some success. That
is, at any time after the recording of
the tax deed an action may be brought
against the former owner in the nature of a suit to quiet title. If he does
not appear a judgment by default is
usually entered quieting and confirming the title in the tax title holder
against the former owner and all those
interested. If the law relative to service has been strictly and literally
complied with (which I find seldom
happens) the judgment of the court
gives a title which is indefeasible at
the future suit of the former owner.
If the former owner should appear in
the action and ask to have his title
quieted and the tax deed canceled, he
is then compelled to do equity and the
tax title holder receives back his purchase money with a good rate of interest, and the ends of the law are
humanely served-the former owner
has back his property and has paid
his taxes and the tax purchaser is
fully reimbursed.
There is another method which is
quaint, but I have often thought, all
things considered, that it is about the
best I know. I was trying a suit to
set aside a tax deed in Washington
County some years ago against a very
able and eloquent old lawyer who
lived out there. He went on the stand
to prove some item of his case and I
asked him on cross-examination if he
were a lawyer, if he had not been present there at numerous terms of court
and had seen many tax titles invalidated by the judgment of the court.
He admitted that this was true. I
then asked him how he expected to
ever make a title out of the instrument
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under which he was claiming. He
hesitated a moment and finally said
that he thought it could be done by
limitation, procrastination, litigation
and negotiation. After some years of
experience and investigation of the
subject I am persuaded that the old
man had evolved an idea that had in
it greater merit than appeared to a
casual observer.
In closing permit me to suggest that
after nearly thirty years of practice
and study of the law of tax titles, I
have concluded that inasmuch as practically every tax deed means uncer-

tainty and protracted litigation, and
inasmuch as a tax deed is not a title
worth considering in this State, the
entire law of tax sales, redemptions
and tax deeds ought to be re-written to
the end that somewhere in the procedure the rights of a stubborn, careless
and negligent tax-payer should be cut
off, extinguished and barred in a sane,
just and sensible way. Does it not
strike the Bar of this City and State
that a system, the only result of which
is litigation and doubt, should be replaced by a just system of certainty
and security?

Verbal Leases
By JESSE H. SHERMAN, Esq.
of the Denver Bar
Under our Statute of Frauds, every
contract for the sale of real estate
must be in writing, yet a verbal lease
for the period of one year is valid and
enforceable. Not only is a verbal lease
for one year valid, but a lease for one
year to begin in future is also valid.
3 Colo. 287. 49 L.R.A. N.S. 820. It is
possible to make a verbal lease for
one year and then tack upon such
lease another verbal lease for another
year to begin at the expiration of the
first year. This virtually permits a
verbal agreement to cover a two year
period, and no one knows how many
times this process could be repeated.
The purpose of a written contract
is to perpetuate the agreement of the
parties in such permanent form that it
cannot be disputed. The wisdom of
requiring contracts for the sale of real
estate to be in writing is so apparent
that no one would have this law
changed, but the wisdom of permitting
leases to rest in parol is not so al)parent, even though the term is limited.
If there ever was any justification for
a verbal lease, conditions have now

changed so that the law should be
abolished.
Recognizing the uncertainty of verbal contracts, the law wisely refuses
to enforce a verbal contract for the
sale of real estate, and the law makes
no distinction in the value of the real
estate involved. It requires all such
contracts to be in writing, and all verbal contracts for the sale of real estate are condemned, whether the
property is worth $1,000.00 or only
$100.00. All opportunity for disagreement is removed by requiring written
agreements in every case.
There is just as great an opportunity for a misunderstanding over a
lease for one year as there is over a
lease for ten years, yet the law requires a ten year lease to be in writing
and it places its stamp of approval
upon the one year verbal lease. Instead of requiing the same certainty
in respect to a short time lease which
it requires of a long time lease, the law
invites the parties to enter into a
verbal lease for one year with all its
uncertainties and then offers the good

